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The aim of this study is to ascertain perceptions of public sector corruption that university students, as 
potentially influential members of society, hold. The study is based on a purposive sample of 509 first- and 
second-year university students. Descriptive and non-parametric bivariate analysis suggests that students 
overwhelmingly regard public sector corruption as an important issue. In addition, there appear to be 
remarkable degrees of consensus as to what actions are perceived as corrupt even if there is evidence of 
mismatches between students’ beliefs and likely actions. At least some of this dissonance may be explained 
by the finding that respondents' corruption perceptions are biased by gender and ethnicity. These are 
challenges that programmes aimed at inspiring mass public opinion to join the fight against corruption may 
have to address. 
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There is increasing awareness of the costs  
of corruption as documented in a growing 
international literature. The Country Corruption 
Assessment Report (CCAR) (Anon., 2003) 
identifies the following evils of corruption: it 
hamstrings economic development, interferes 
with good governance, erodes stability of – 
and trust in – government’, damages the ethos 
of democratic government and has considerable 
social and economic costs.  
Anti-corruption initiatives are a common, 
and politically expedient, response to perceptions 
of high and rising levels of corruption. The 
latest Corruptions Perceptions Index (Anon., 
2010a) ranks South Africa at number 54 out of 
178 countries, where 1 is the least corrupt 
country. South Africa’s corruption rating in 
terms of Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) has deteriorated 
consistently from 5.1 in 2007 to 4.5 in 2010 
(Anon., 2010a). Van der Merwe (2006) finds 
that corruption is perceived by public servants 
to be widespread throughout KwaZulu-Natal 
provincial and national government departments.  
Official concern about corruption levels in 
South Africa and how to tackle it gained 
momentum in 1999 with the launch of the 
National Anti-Corruption Initiative and the 
creation of the National Anti-Corruption 
Forum in 2001 (Baqwa, 1999). Following the 
implementation of these and, subsequently, a 
host of other measures aimed at reducing 
corruption the question must be asked: how 
effective are they if South Africa has become  
a more corrupt country in recent years?  
A heightened national sensitivity towards 
corruption is evident in the National Planning 
Commission’s (2011a) Diagnostic Report in 
which it identifies corruption as one of nine 
major challenges facing the country. 
 This paper explores, on a case study basis, 
the attitudes of university students in KwaZulu-
Natal to aspects of public sector corruption and 
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also discusses the possible implications of the 
corruption perceptions of young citizens for 
the local fight against corruption. It proposes 
that South Africa’s general anticorruption 
approach, which is essentially founded on a 
mix of principal-agent theory and institutional 
perspectives, is flawed in at least three 
respects. Firstly, the principal-agent model 
depends on the principal for implementing 
reforms and this is a weakness if one considers 
that there may be several principals each with 
incoherent objectives and diverse interests 
(Andvig, Fjelstad, Amundsen, Sissener & 
Soreide, 2000).  Secondly, the principal-agent 
notion that it is invariably the principal’s 
objective to reduce corruption, and that the 
principal is therefore not corrupt, may not 
always be the case. Finally, anticorruption 
measures can have no significant effect, may 
find no traction, if there is no real belief in the 
imperative of acting ethically and morally. 
There can be no effective monitoring of 
corruption if society does not perceive certain 
actions as corrupt or discounts their true cost 
(Olken, 2007).  
This article probes the possibility that the 
notions university students, as potential 
community leaders, have of what constitutes 
ethical and moral behaviour may be highly 
variable so as to confound efforts to harness 
mass public opinion in the local fight against 
graft. The discussion brings to the fore the 
issue of integrity and ethics education in South 
African schools and institutions of higher 
learning as a vital, although evidently neglected, 
component of local corruption control. The 
notion of introducing formal ethics education 
at school and university level is not without 
precedent (Van der Merwe, 2004). However, 
such programmes would need to be sensitive to 
society's perceptions of corruption. 
The study considers the following questions: 
1. How serious do university students perceive 
the problem of public sector corruption to 
be?  
2. What actions do students believe constitute 
corrupt behaviour? 
3. Are students’ perceptions of what constitutes 
corruption influenced by factors such as 
gender, ethnicity and religious beliefs? 
The answers to these questions may shed more 
light on the bigger question of how best to 
mobilise public opinion in the fight against 
local public sector corruption. 
Section 2 reviews some of the literature on 
corruption; Section 3 explains the study’s 
methodology, Section 4 discusses the analysis 
and results and Section 5 concludes. 
2 
Review of the literature 
2.1 Defining corruption 
The many possible varieties of corruption render 
it a difficult-to-define and complex phenomenon 
so that it becomes problematic to distinguish 
corruption from other forms of social 
exchange. For the purposes of this discussion 
corruption is regarded to be: 
-…behaviour which deviates from the 
formal duties of a public role because of 
private-regarding (personal, close family, private 
clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates 
rules against the exercise of certain types of 
private regarding influence. This includes 
behaviour such as bribery (use of a reward to 
pervert the judgment of a person in a position 
of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by 
reason of ascriptive relationship rather than 
merit); and misappropriation (illegal use of 
public resources for private gain). (Nye, 
1967:419).  
2.2 Corruption: predisposing factors 
The international literature suggests that, 
historically, corrupt behaviour may be influenced 
by a range of variables: natural resource 
availability, culture/ethnicity, masculinity, un-
certainty, religion, power distance, inequity, 
the quality of public institutions, size of 
government, level of development, market 
regulation, the market system and economic 
conditions. 
Thus some evidence has been reported that 
population size and natural resource wealth 
appear to be positively correlated with the 
incidence of bribery (Cartier-Bresson, 2000; 
Andvig et al., 2000). Other studies report that 
corruption appears to be influenced by 
attitudes, paradigms and values deeply rooted 
in the culture of certain populations (Husted, 
1999; Getz & Volkema, 2001). Several studies 
record that males are more likely than women 
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to act corruptly (Lambsdorff, 1999; Getz & 
Volkema, 2001; Bowman & Gilligan, 2008). 
Paldam (2001) found that certain religions may 
be more tolerant of corruption and that 
religious diversity reduces the incidence of 
corruption. 
Husted (1999) proposed that corruption is 
tolerated more readily in high power distance 
(paternalistic) cultures than in low power 
distance cultures. The quality of public 
institutions such as government offices, the 
judiciary and the media have been associated 
with corruption levels (Cartier-Bresson, 2000). 
Lambsdorff (1999) notes that corruption levels 
have been shown to increase when government 
regulation imposes a heavy burden on business 
competitiveness. 
Corruption is more likely to be exposed in 
developed countries precisely because their 
public institutions such as the press and other 
media tend to be more established. This is 
apart from the consideration that economic 
development increases the spread of education, 
literacy and depersonalized relationships, all of 
which act to constrain graft (Andvig et al., 
2000). There seems to be some consensus that 
the prospect of economic adversity heightens 
the appeal of corruption (Getz & Volkema, 
2001; Razafrindrakoto & Roubaud, 2003). 
2.3 Nuances of corruption in  
South Africa 
The values and norms of a particular society 
can be expected to inform its attitudes to 
corruption. South Africa has a complex 
politico-economic history and this affects the 
genesis and character of local corruption. 
Spencer (2001) suggests that South Africans 
seem to have difficulty distinguishing between 
legality and morality. He proposes that 
morality is concerned with objective principles 
such as duty, obligation and fairness which 
should be universally desirable. Thus legality 
deals with what one can get away with while 
morality deals with what one should not 
attempt to avoid.  
Bauer (2000) asserts that the aspect of racial 
entitlement enshrined in the philosophy of 
apartheid contributed to the development of a 
culture of corruption. Within this system, some 
officials had become disillusioned in their 
efforts to serve the apartheid policy of mass 
removals and resettlements of people. Such 
officials would thus help themselves to the 
large amounts of funds allocated to these 
projects which, in many instances, held no 
appeal for them and were probably considered 
in any case to be wasteful expenditure.  
Apartheid thus perverted not only the 
morals of its mandarins but also those on 
whom it was inflicted. Kaunda (2001) 
proposes that apartheid left behind a legacy of 
a serious breakdown of morals in South 
African society. She suggests that the results of 
this collapse can be seen in, among other 
instances, diminishing parental control of 
children, a lack of respect for authority and the 
rule of law and high and rising levels of crime 
and corruption. Mthombothi (2000) agrees that 
apartheid fostered moral depravity and that all 
South Africans have been corrupted by it. He 
proposes that South African society, generally, 
is tolerant of dishonest and corrupt conduct, 
that cheating is ubiquitous whether in the form 
of tax evasion, illegal transfers of money out of 
the country or dubious business practices. 
Indeed it seems that the spectre of corruption 
lingers on in the post-apartheid era. Makhanya 
(2003) confirms that South African society is 
apparently becoming increasingly apathetic 
about the phenomenon of graft in seeming to 
accept that this is inevitable in government.  
In South Africa’s new political dispensation 
corruption appears to have some subtly unique 
characteristics. A common thread linking 
many of the transactions that have been 
labelled as corrupt after the advent of 
democracy in 1994 is that they have drawn 
openly on the privilege of political office or 
connections in government (Van der Merwe, 
2004; Lund, 2010). Considerable evidence has 
been cited of corrupt transactions between 
government and favoured groups or cliques 
(Haffejee, 2001; Ayoob, 2003). Hogg (2011) 
notes that many appear to regard this 
“reciprocity” between government and select 
beneficiaries as due reward for loyal support. 
He observes, furthermore, that the arrangement 
may enjoy currency as a tool of economic 
empowerment.  
Transactions concluded by some public 
officials verge on blatant criminality. It is 
common cause that South Africa has a high 
crime rate which fact Rautenbach (2000) 





proposes is a characteristic of a nonconformist 
society. Nonconformist societies are typically 
heterogeneous and display large social 
cleavages in terms of language, ethnicity, 
religion, education levels and income. Such 
societies - South Africa being a good example 
in Rautenbach’s estimation - tend to have high 
levels of disorder, indiscipline and disregard 
for the law. It is not inconceivable that, in such 
an environment, there might be a nexus 
between crime and corruption. 
The capacity to corrupt public processes 
provides significant regulatory advantages by 
protecting criminal enterprise (Shaw, 1998; 
Baqwa, 1999). Thus crime and corruption 
thrive in a symbiotic relationship. This is an 
intuitively appealing notion if one considers, 
for instance, the corruption charges that were 
brought against South Africa’s erstwhile Police 
Commissioner (Anon., 2008) and the criminal 
charges against the wife of South Africa’s 
State Security Minister (Anon., 2010b). 
Organized crime within the country is reported 
to be rife (Irish, 2003; Hartley, 2009) and it 
appears that corruption in commerce, law 
enforcement and in other government 
departments perpetuates this situation (Irish, 
2003). Indeed, President Zuma (2009, 2010) 
has, in two consecutive state-of-the-nation 
addresses felt it necessary to pledge greater 
efforts and resources to combating corruption 
in the public sector. 
Survey results suggest that a decline in 
ethics and morals is the most commonly cited 
cause of corruption in South African society in 
general (Camerer, 2001; Van der Merwe 2006). 
The Country Corruption Assessment Report 
(Anon., 2003) claims evidence of a decay in 
moral values in general within society. 
Landman (2000) argues that South Africa is 
undergoing a moral and ethical crisis as a 
result of centuries of social engineering of the 
worst kind. He suggests that this circumstance 
has been compounded by the country’s sudden 
political changes commencing in 1994 with all 
its attendant insecurities and new institutions, 
unemployment and other factors such as HIV 
and Aids. Greed and moral dislocation, 
symptoms of distorted values, have also been 
identified as major causes of local crime and 
corruption (Camerer, 2001; Rauch, 2005; Van 
der Merwe, 2006).  
2.4  A note on South Africa’s general 
anticorruption approach 
The character of corruption and its likely 
causes should inform efforts to combat it 
Historically, there appear to be three distinct 
approaches to controlling corruption (Doig & 
Riley, 1998): those based on economic 
analyses, those founded on mass public opinion 
or civic culture perspectives and those 
informed by institutional viewpoints. The 
institutional approach to corruption control 
emphasizes the strengthening of institutions 
such as anti-corruption agencies or functions 
and procedures within organisations such as 
registers of interest and codes to delineate the 
expectations the public has of officials. Mass 
public opinion perspectives examine the social 
or cultural context of corruption and suggest 
mass attitudinal change or civic awareness 
anti-corruption strategies. Economic analyses 
of corruption generally mostly prioritize the 
principal-agent approach which is rooted in 
neoclassical economic theory and has been 
used extensively by the World Bank.  
The debate on the effectiveness of anti-
corruption strategies has changed markedly 
since the 1980s. The development agenda of 
the 1990s focused on developing market 
economies and liberal democratic systems 
(Riley, 1998). Within this agenda, the new 
context of corruption was conditioned by two 
assumptions. The first is that public sector 
corruption will be reduced if the size of the 
state is reduced. The second is that a move to 
liberal pluralist politics, a freer press and the 
creation of other independent institutions (the 
judiciary for instance) will reduce corruption 
by making it vulnerable to exposure. Riley 
noted that the policy agenda of the 1990s 
assumed a limited, legitimate and honest state 
which in fact may not be the case when the 
state sector is swollen, corrupt and inefficient 
and individual and group interests have 
priority over the public good.         
Modern corruption control techniques appear 
to be strongly informed by principal-agent/ 
incentive theory. According to this philosophy, 
the principal is assumed to be honest while the 
agent/official and client are motivated by self-
interest. Thus any decision by the agent and 
client to behave dishonestly is based on 
calculations of potential personal gains and 
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losses that may result from these actions. 
Accordingly, measures designed to constrain 
corruption include reducing opportunities for 
exacting economic rents and the exercising of 
monopoly power by means of deregulation and 
privatization. Furthermore, administrative reform 
may be aimed at reducing officials’ discretion 
and also demanding greater accountability 
from public servants. The building up of 
institutions such as auditing and accounting 
units, legal reforms and encouraging public 
oversight through parliament and a more 
vibrant civil society are also core components 
of modern corruption control. 
Van der Merwe (2004) notes that South 
Africa has in place most of the constituent 
elements of a sound anticorruption system. 
This includes a comprehensive and practical 
legislative framework as well as various anti-
corruption and law enforcement agencies. 
Mechanisms to report corruption are in place 
as well as strong frameworks for financial, 
procurement risk and human resource manage-
ment.  Van der Merwe finds, in spite of this, 
that local anticorruption initiatives have evidently 
had no significant impact on KwaZulu-Natal 
public sector corruption levels. He argues that 
this state of affairs can be blamed on, amongst 
other things, a failure to implement existing 
measures and strategies due to a lack of 
resources and political will. Thus the 
institutions charged with keeping corruption in 
check (institutional approach to corruption 
control) lack the capacity to do so effectively. 
Woods (2011) argues that this failure of 
government organisations to properly apply 
systems creates opportunities for would-be 
perpetrators of corruption. The reality of 
corrupt principals, whose activities will be 
further shrouded by a veil of state-sanctioned 
secrecy if the mooted Protection of Infor-
mation Bill is passed in undiluted form, 
suggests that the principal-agent approach to 
corruption control can enjoy only limited 
success. 
The CCAR (Anon., 2003) identifies the 
following causes of corruption within South 
Africa’s private and public sectors:  inefficient 
control mechanisms, insufficient anticorruption 
training, greed, poverty and the decay of  
moral societal values. Its anticorruption 
recommendations are correspondingly set out 
under five headings: enhancing institutional 
capacity to fight corruption, improving 
management policies and practices in the 
public service, slicker reporting of corruption, 
creating partnerships in the fight against 
corruption and promoting ethics and civic 
awareness. This study is particularly interested 
in the prospects that the last three 
recommendations hold for corruption control 
insofar as they hint at the need to mobilise 
mass public opinion more effectively in the 
fight against corruption.  
3 
Research method 
This study employed a purposive sampling 
design in that it is based on a survey of first- 
and second-year students enrolled in particular 
economics and business/administration classes 
at both the Durban University of Technology 
(DUT, Pietermaritzburg) and University of 
KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN, Durban) in 2010. The 
choice of sample was influenced by the 
consideration that university students are likely 
to become leaders and opinion makers (Anon., 
2011), citizens who are most likely to demand 
accountability in respect of curbing corruption. 
The relatively large sample size (n = 509) 
offers a measure of confidence that the sample 
is reasonably representative of the population 
from which it was drawn. The mainly nominal 
and ordinal nature of the survey data, dictated 
the employment of non-parametric inferential 
analytical techniques together with some 
descriptive statistical analysis.  
The survey instrument employed to gather 
the data comprises a short biographical section 
with four questions relating to respondents’ 
gender, age, ethnicity and religious beliefs. 
The literature generally confirms that gender 
(Bowman & Gilligan, 2008), ethnicity (Getz & 
Volkema, 2001) and religion (Paldam, 2001) 
have all been implicated in the corruption 
perceptions that individuals hold. The balance 
of the questionnaire (totalling sixteen rating 
scale items) solicits the views, perceptions and 
attitudes of respondents to aspects of public 
sector corruption. The study, in seeking to 
construct meaning and knowledge from 
respondents’ perceptions, draws on the 
qualitative approach to research design. Within 





this framework research outcomes are neither 
totally objective nor unquestionably certain 
(Henning, Van Rensburg & Smit, 2004).   
The survey instrument was duly piloted and 
refined before it was administered. Practical 
considerations dictated a survey technique in 
which accessible first- and second-year 
economics/administration classes, with the 
permission of lecturers, were subsequently 
surveyed at both campuses during scheduled 
lectures. Respondents were generally able to 
complete the questionnaire, on average, in 
about 10-15 minutes.  
4 
Analysis and discussion 
The first part of the research collected 
demographic data from the respondents and 
asked five questions about their attitudes 
towards corruption in South Africa.  
4.1  Sample characteristics 
Of the 509 respondents, 53.8 per cent are 
females and 46.2 per cent are males. Their 
mean age was 20.2 years, with 79 per cent 
aged 19 to 21 years. In terms of ethnicity, 318 
of the respondents (62.4 per cent) are black 
and 168 (33.0 per cent) are Indian, with small 
numbers of whites (12) and coloureds (11). As 
to the importance of their religious beliefs, 95 
per cent said that these were at least important 
(62.2 per cent = very important and 32.8 per 
cent = important) to them; the pilot survey 
indicated that asking respondents for their 
particular religion or denomination was 
problematic and so these were not sought in 
the main survey.  
4.2  Perceptions of the seriousness of 
local public sector corruption 
Respondents were asked ‘How serious an issue 
do you think corruption is in South Africa 
these days?’ Almost all respondents regarded it 
as either very serious (73.7 per cent) or serious 
(23.4 per cent). In response to a question 
asking them to compare levels of corruption 
now compared with three years ago, almost 
half (47.2 per cent) thought it was much worse 
and 31.8 per cent that it was a bit worse. This 
result would seem to corroborate the trend of 
perceived worsening corruption in the three 
years leading up 2010 highlighted by 
Transparency International's CPI. 
Three questions were asked about perceptions 
of corruption among public servants, politicians 
and by the president on a scale ranging from 
10 (extremely corrupt) to 0 (not at all corrupt). 
Public servants were given a mean score of 
8.0, somewhat less than that given to 
politicians (8.6). Both are towards the very 
corrupt end of the scale. The president was 
better regarded, with a mean score of 6.8. It 
was intended to cross tabulate these and later 
responses by gender, age, ethnicity and 
importance of religion. However, the narrow 
age range and the importance of their religious 
beliefs to almost all respondents meant that 
these two variables could not be used for cross 
tabulation purposes. The small numbers of 
whites and coloureds in the sample meant that 
ethnic comparisons had to be restricted to 
those between blacks and Indians. 
There were no significant gender differences 
concerning respondents’ ratings of the 
seriousness of corruption, whether corruption 
had become more of a problem and their 
ratings of the corruptness of politicians, public 
servants and the president. It is notable, though, 
that Indian respondents were significantly 
more likely than black respondents to regard 
corruption as very serious and to have become 
much worse. A strong majority of both groups, 
it should be noted, regarded it as very serious 
and becoming much worse. Indian respondents 
perceived higher corruption among politicians 
and public servants than did black respondents 
and rated the president at 8.1 on the corruption 
scale compared with 5.9 by black respondents. 
These apparent ethnic differences will be 
examined further. 
4.3  What is perceived as ’corrupt’ 
behavior? 
Individuals’ perceptions of the extent of 
corruption must logically be informed by what 
they regard to be corrupt behavior. The 
uniformity, or otherwise, of corruption per-
ceptions has implications for monitoring and 
policing corrupt actions (Olken, 2007). Thus, if 
behavior is overwhelmingly considered to be 
corrupt, it may be easier to detect and the 
policing of such actions is likely to enjoy 
popular support. Such a development, on the 
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back of galvanized mass public opinion, could 
be expected to strengthen South Africa’s fight 
against public sector graft. 
The second part of the research involved 
posing 10 short scenarios (these are listed in 
the left hand column of Table 1) and asking 
two questions of each: first, whether the 
respondent regarded the behaviour described 
as corrupt, with four options running from 
“very corrupt” to “not at all corrupt”, plus a 
category for those who were unsure; and 
second, whether the student would engage in 
the activity, with responses running from 
“definitely not” to “definitely yes”, with a 
“don’t know” category. The results are reported 
in Tables 1 and 2 respectively.  
Many of the scenarios drew on cases of 
possible corruption reported in the South 
African media during 2009 and the early part 
of 2010. Prominent among these were reports 
of tendering irregularities, of inflated claims 
for travel expenses by politicians, of public 
servants engaging in private business work 
during office hours and of close relations 
between politicians and public servants on the 
one hand and business people on the other. It is 
likely that students had some knowledge of 
these examples and of the explicit or implicit 
messages in the media about them but this 
does not, in our view, lead to any concerns 
about our scenarios. These were intended  
to uncover student attitudes towards such 
behaviours and their possible future involve-
ment in them. At the same time, while we have 
no way of knowing that students answered 
honestly, we see little reason for them to lie.  
 
Table 1 
Perceptions of the degree of corruption involved in the 10 scenarios (per cent) 
Scenario Very corrupt 
Fairly 
corrupt 
A little bit 
corrupt 
Not at all 
corrupt Unsure 
1.  A businessman pays R1.2 million to a politician to 
encourage the politician to award a major 
government contract to him 86.1 10.6 1.6 0.4 1.4 
2.  Correct tender processes for a local government 
road building project are not followed; rather, the 
contract is simply given to a company, with no 
particular experience, owned by friends of the most 
powerful councillors 79.3 14.8 2.2 1.0 2.8 
3.  A government official arranges for his  sister to get 
a job (for which she is qualified) in his department 
without having to go through the normal application 
and selection procedures  42.5 34.2 19.0 3.5 0.8 
4.  A politician makes sure that a lot of public works are 
carried out in his own community area, which 
means that other communities are neglected. 47.9 30.3 15.5 3.5 2.7 
5.  A public servant who travels a lot as part of her 
work submits claims for reimbursements which are 
far above the real cost to her 44.4 33.1 13.8 2.9 5.7 
6. A public servant spends a number of hours of his 
work time each week running his private business 
activities 
38.2 
 32.4 18.7 7.2 3.6 
7.  A traffic policeman asks a motorist for R100 in order 
for the motorist not to be fined for a traffic offence 73.4 20.0 5.2 1.1 0.2 
8.  A cleaner for a university earns R1000 per month 
from her job. She takes home cleaning fluid and 
other small items which she sells to supplement her 
income – by about R30 per month 25.8 31.9 33.3 7.9 1.1 
9.  Most teachers in a rural school do not come to work 
on Fridays 56.1 21.8 10.6 4.5 6.9 
10.  A business firm makes a substantial donation to the 
ruling political party each year. The firm doesn’t 
have particular plans but hopes that they will be 
regarded well by the government in the future 30.3 26.8 15.7 18.1 9.1 
 





Table 1 indicates that all 10 scenarios were 
judged to be corrupt or fairly corrupt by half or 
more of the respondents. The responses can be 
classified into three groups.  
1. Scenarios 1, 2 and 7 were rated as very 
corrupt or fairly corrupt by over 90 per 
cent of respondents 
2. Scenarios 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9 were so rated by 
70-79 per cent of respondents 
3. Scenarios 8 and 10 were so rated by 57 per 
cent of respondents. 
The first group, comprising direct monetary 
bribes and illegal tender decisions, represents 
classic corrupt behaviour whereas there is 
more to consider in the scenarios of the second 
group. Scenario 3, for example, involves a 
possible conflict between interfering with a job 
selection process and helping a relative. It is 
possible that respondents found the two 
scenarios in the last group difficult to 
categorise. One is theft, albeit of a low level, 
while the last concerns the relationship between 
government and business and the responses 
may involve judgements about the appropriate-
ness of this relationship rather than corruption 
as such. 
The second question – whether the respondent 
would engage in the activity – was asked to 
determine whether respondents’ anticipated 
behaviour matched their opinion concerning 
the corruptness of that behaviour. The term 
“dissonance” is used to describe a disconnection 
between beliefs and behaviour. The results are 
presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Willingness to engage in the activity involved in the 10 scenarios (per cent) 












1.  Would you pay a politician? 51.4 21.5 15.7 3.3 8.1 
2.  Would you agree to irregular tendering 
practices? 
72.2 19.4 4.3 1.4 2.7 
3.  Would you get your sister a job without 
going through the normal procedures? 
36.0 27.0 27.2 4.7 5.1 
4.  Would you favour your own community? 45.1 23.9 19.0 3.4 8.6 
5.  Would you inflate your travel claims? 42.0 30.0 17.2 3.4 7.4 
6.  Would you run your private business 
from work? 
38.1 32.2 19.9 3.8 6.1 
7.  Would you ask for a bribe? 66.5 18.7 9.2 3.1 2.5 
8.  Would you take small items from work? 32.0 28.0 29.0 6.3 4.7 
9.  Would you stay away from school on 
Fridays? 
56.1 21.8 10.6 4.5 6.9 
10.  Would you donate to a political party? 34.9 27.4 20.5 7.3 9.8 
 
Table 1 shows that the average proportion of 
respondents who rated a scenario as very or 
fairly corrupt was 78.7 per cent while Table 2 
shows that an average of 72.4 per cent said that 
they definitely or probably would not perform 
the relevant action themselves. This mismatch 
indicates the possibility of some dissonance 
and the importance of disaggregating the 
responses. Notwithstanding this, it appears that 
respondents' judgements of the actions of 
others are strongly correlated with their own 
likely actions in similar circumstances. Indeed, 
Spearman’s bivariate correlation coefficients 
in all cases are positive and significant (p = 
0.000<0.01, 2-tailed). This overall consistency 
suggests a firm foundation on which to base 
ethics and integrity training.   
4.4  Are corruption perceptions 
influenced by demographic 
characteristics? 
It would be helpful for the purposes of 
harnessing mass public opinion into the anti-
corruption fight to know what factors may 
influence individuals’ views as to what they 
perceive to be corrupt behavior. As far as 
demographic characteristics are concerned 
females were significantly more likely than 
males to regard scenarios 4 (favouring your 
own community) and 6 (running a private 
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business from work) as corrupt behaviour. 
They were also significantly less likely to say 
that they would probably or definitely engage 
in the behaviour outlined in six of the 
scenarios – 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10 (Table 3). 
Indians were more likely than Africans to 
regard scenarios 3, 5, 6 and 9 as corruption. 
African students were significantly more likely 
than Indian students to say that they would 
probably or definitely engage in the behaviours 
outlined in five of the scenarios: 1 and 3-6 
(Table 4).  
 
Table 3 
Perception of activity being corrupt and being willing to engage, by gender  
(rounded to the nearest per cent)                          
Hypothetical scenario 
Corrupt Engage 
Male Female Male Female 
1.   Pay a politician 99 97 27 13** 
2. Irregular tendering practices 96 97 7 5 
3.  Get your sister a job 97 94 36 28 
4.  Favour your own community 89 97** 28 17** 
5.  Inflate your travel claims 90 92 26 16** 
6.  Run business from work 84 93** 27 21** 
7.  Ask for a bribe 99 99 17 8* 
8.  Take small items from work 89 93 41 31 
9.  Stay away from school on Fridays 85 92 8 8 
10. Donate to  political party 69 76 33 23** 
* p< 0.05, **p< 0.01 
Note: Chi-square test results are available from the authors on request. 
 
Table 4 
Perception of activity being corrupt and being willing to engage, by ethnic group  
(rounded to the nearest per cent)                   
Hypothetical scenario 
Corrupt Engage 
African Indian African Indian 
1.  Pay a politician 97 100 25 11** 
2. Irregular tendering practices 94 100 9 1* 
3. Get your sister a job 94 98** 37 25** 
4. Favour your own community 92 98 25 17* 
5. Inflate your travel claims 89 95** 20 22** 
6. Run business from work 89 90** 25 20* 
7. Ask for a bribe 98 99 14 11 
8. Take small items from work 90 93 40 29 
9. Stay away from school on Fridays 90 85** 9 7 
10. Donate to  political party 72 74 29 27 
* p< 0.05, **p< 0.01 
 
Both Tables 3 and 4 reveal apparent anomalies 
indicative of dissonance. Thus males are at 
least as likely as females to report paying a 
politician as corruption but are more likely to 
engage in it. Similarly Africans are more likely 
than Indians to regard absenteeism from work 
as corruption but are at least as likely to do it. 
This evident lack of accord between beliefs 
and actions may seem puzzling at first sight 
but similar results have been found elsewhere. 
For example, Miller’s (2006) study in four 
post-communist European countries found that 
the vast majority of citizens and public 
officials condemned bribery. At the same time, 
significant minorities (and majorities in some 
contexts) admitted asking for bribes and to 
paying bribes. That is, external pressures 
outweighed inner values, leading officials to 





respond to temptation and citizens to extortion. 
Miller interprets this to mean that people are 
best viewed as corruptible rather than as 
corrupt. 
4.5  Implications of the study’s findings 
for South African anti-corruption 
measures 
South Africa’s present anti-corruption approach 
relies, ostensibly, on a partnership between 
government, business and civil society 
(Ramsingh & Dobie, 2006). Olken (2007) 
argues that accurate citizen perceptions of 
corruption are essential for the political 
process to restrain corrupt activity effectively. 
He notes that if individuals’ beliefs about 
corruption inform their decisions about how 
actively to monitor public officials then biases 
in these beliefs may affect their monitoring 
behaviour. Individuals’ beliefs may thus, 
indirectly, impact on corruption control. Any 
programme aimed at mobilising mass public 
opinion, whether formal or informal, must be 
sensitive to factors that may condition popular 
corruption perceptions. 
This study’s findings that virtually all (97.1 
per cent) respondents consider corruption to be 
at least a serious domestic issue, and that 79 
per cent of respondents believe that corruption 
levels increased since 2007, suggest that 
important sections of society are sensitive to 
the issue and may thus be receptive to being 
more actively engaged in resisting it. These 
findings suggest that the National Planning 
Commission’s call to place greater emphasis 
on preventing corruption through public 
education drives (2011b) may prove fruitful. 
Indeed, the recent withdrawal (if only temporary) 
of the proposed Protection of Information Bill 
(Underhill & Donnelly, 2011) and the decision 
to reopen the investigation into the country’s 
controversial arms deal (Bauer, 2011) signal 
important victories forced by civil society.   
The findings of this study also indicate that 
there appears to be broad consensus as to what 
constitutes corrupt behaviour although certain 
acts may be regarded as more corrupt than 
others. It seems, furthermore, that respondents, 
despite evidence of some dissonance, are 
generally willing to be judged by their own 
standards. At least some of the lack of 
agreement between respondents’ beliefs and 
likely actions may be accounted for by the 
influences of gender and ethnicity. The study 
offers evidence that males, even though they 
may recognise corrupt behaviour, are more 
likely than females to engage in such acts. 
Similarly, different race groups are evidently 
more likely to risk particular types of 
questionable behaviour even if they recognise 
it as such. These are challenges that appeals to 
civil society to join in the fight against 
corruption, whether formally through training 
programmes or informally, will have to 
address.  
5 
Limitations of the study 
The case approach employed in this study 
suggests that its findings are not generalisable 
with any degree of confidence beyond the 
2010 population of first and second-year 
economics and business students registered  
at the DUT (Pietermaritzburg) and UKZN 
(Durban) campuses. Future studies could 
examine aspects of local public sector corrupt-
tion using larger samples at, or across, higher 
education institutions. Such studies could also 
explore, more minutely, the prospects of 
incorporating ethics and anticorruption modules 
into credit bearing courses.     
6 
Conclusion 
This study set out to gauge the perceptions that 
first and second-year economics and business/ 
administration Durban University of Technology 
and UKZN students have of aspects of local 
public sector corruption and to assess the 
implications of these perceptions for the local 
fight against graft. The study was inspired by 
the proposition that South Africa’s present 
anti-corruption approach (informed primarily 
by a mix of principal-agent theory and 
institutional perspectives) needs to be reinforced 
with comprehensive civic awareness initiatives 
as recommended in the CCAR.  
The study’s findings that respondents, 
overwhelmingly, considered corruption to be a 
serious problem suggests that potentially 
influential sections of society may be willing 
partners in the fight against local public sector 
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graft. It seems, furthermore, that the notions 
that respondents - regardless of gender, 
ethnicity and religious beliefs - have of what 
constitutes ethical and moral behaviour are in 
fact not highly variable so that initiatives to 
build on society's common ethical core should 
yield some return. Indeed, evidence of some 
mismatch between respondents' beliefs and 
actions suggests a need to align these, possibly 
by means of formal ethics and integrity 
schooling programmes. 
Since individuals’ views and opinions are 
significantly influenced by schooling it may be 
worth considering the prospects of introducing 
ethics and anticorruption education at all 
stages of formal education, that is, primary, 
secondary and tertiary levels. Such programmes, 
if they are to be effective, may need to be 
particularly sensitive to issues relating to 
gender and ethnicity. Efforts to introduce 
integrity training at an early age could serve to 
consolidate lasting belief in the value of ethical 
conduct and good governance and would 
naturally strengthen civil society’s role in the 
local anti-corruption compact.  
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